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Abstract—	  Authorization	  infrastructures	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  any	  network	  where	  resources	  need	  
to	  be	  protected.	  They	  act	  as	  the	  gateway	  for	  providing	  (or	  denying)	  subjects	  (users)	  access	  to	  
resources.	  As	  networks	  expand	  and	  organizations	  start	  to	  federate	  access	  to	  their	  resources,	  
authorization	  infrastructures	  become	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  manage.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  explore	  the	  
automatic	  adaptation	  of	  authorization	  assets	  (policies	  and	  subject	  access	  rights)	  in	  order	  to	  manage	  
federated	  authorization	  infrastructures.	  We	  demonstrate	  adaptation	  through	  a	  Self-­‐Adaptive	  
Authorization	  Framework	  (SAAF)	  controller	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  managing	  policy	  based	  federated	  
role/attribute	  access	  control	  authorization	  infrastructures.	  The	  SAAF	  controller	  implements	  a	  
feedback	  loop	  to	  monitor	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  assets	  and	  subjects’	  
behavior,	  analyze	  potential	  adaptations	  for	  handling	  abnormal	  behavior,	  and	  act	  upon	  assets	  of	  an	  
authorization	  infrastructure	  for	  changing	  its	  configuration.	  A	  prototype	  of	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  is	  
evaluated	  in	  a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  (federation)	  built	  with	  SimpleSAMLphp,	  in	  
which	  a	  PERMIS	  standalone	  authorization	  server	  protects	  a	  service	  provider’s	  resources,	  and	  identity	  
providers	  utilize	  LDAP	  directories	  to	  store	  subject	  authentication	  and	  authorization	  attributes.	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1. Introduction	  
A	  great	  deal	  of	  research	  and	  time	  is	  put	  into	  securing	  access	  to,	  and	  ensuring	  legitimate	  use	  of	  
protected	  resources.	  There	  exist	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  approaches	  such	  as,	  role	  based	  access	  control	  
(RBAC)	  [1]	  and	  attribute	  based	  access	  control	  (ABAC)	  [2],	  as	  well	  as	  more	  sophisticated	  systems	  
involving	  detection	  [3],	  trust	  and	  reputation	  [4],	  and	  usage	  control	  [5]	  to	  compliment	  authorization.	  
However,	  once	  authorization	  has	  been	  setup	  (i.e.,	  defining	  authorization	  policies)	  there	  exist	  few	  
automated	  mechanisms	  that	  both	  identify	  when	  such	  access	  is	  being	  used	  incorrectly,	  and	  mitigate	  
or	  prevent	  further	  misuse	  automatically.	  Traditionally	  organizations	  rely	  on	  audit	  trails	  and	  human	  
administrators	  to	  monitor	  these	  systems	  to	  identify	  abnormal	  behavior	  [6].	  The	  detection	  of	  
abnormal	  behavior,	  attributed	  to	  the	  misuse	  of	  system	  resources	  by	  authorized	  subjects,	  is	  often	  not	  
at	  the	  forefront	  of	  concern	  for	  organizations.	  However,	  it	  is	  known	  that	  an	  internally	  authorized	  user	  
can	  cause	  far	  greater	  damage	  in	  comparison	  to	  an	  external	  attacker	  simply	  due	  to	  their	  access	  rights	  
[7].	  For	  example,	  during	  July	  2010	  it	  is	  alleged	  that	  a	  US	  army	  intelligence	  analyst	  downloaded	  0.25	  
million	  classified	  US	  military	  documents	  from	  a	  US	  Department	  of	  Defense	  website	  [8].	  Assuming	  the	  
analyst	  was	  an	  authorized	  user	  and	  that	  access	  was	  requested	  and	  granted	  on	  a	  document-­‐by-­‐
document	  basis,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  analyst	  had	  appropriate	  access	  rights	  and	  utilized	  the	  
authorization	  system	  correctly.	  Any	  automated	  monitoring	  of	  the	  authorization	  system	  would	  not	  
have	  picked	  up	  abnormal	  behavior	  as	  the	  authorization	  service	  processed	  the	  analyst’s	  access	  
requests	  according	  to	  its	  access	  control	  policies.	  However,	  to	  a	  human	  administrator	  numerous	  
similar	  requests	  in	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  would	  have	  flagged	  up	  inappropriate	  behavior,	  requiring	  
immediate	  changes	  to	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  to	  mitigate	  any	  further	  damage.	  	  
Federated	  authorization	  builds	  upon	  existing	  authorization	  models,	  including	  RBAC	  and	  ABAC.	  It	  
provides	  the	  method	  through	  which	  large	  scale	  distributed	  access	  can	  be	  granted.	  For	  example,	  
within	  a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  that	  utilizes	  the	  ABAC	  authorization	  model,	  a	  subject	  
is	  assigned	  attributes	  by	  one	  organization	  (e.g.,	  an	  identity	  provider),	  and	  each	  attribute	  is	  assigned	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permissions	  by	  another	  organization	  (the	  service	  provider).	  In	  federated	  access,	  RBAC/ABAC	  is	  
extended	  to	  state	  which	  organizations	  (i.e.,	  identity	  providers)	  are	  trusted	  to	  assign	  which	  attributes	  
to	  which	  subjects.	  This	  requires	  a	  subject	  to	  have	  a	  relationship	  with	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  trusted	  
organizations.	  	  
Assuming	  that	  all	  subjects	  act	  appropriately	  within	  their	  access	  rights	  is	  an	  increasingly	  risky	  
assumption	  to	  make,	  especially	  relevant	  as	  organizations	  work	  together	  and	  federate	  their	  access	  
control	  systems.	  As	  the	  number	  of	  subjects	  with	  federated	  access	  grows,	  as	  does	  the	  risk	  of	  insider	  
threat.	  This	  is	  made	  even	  more	  challenging	  to	  manage	  in	  federated	  access,	  as	  resource	  holders	  are	  
unaware	  of	  who	  is	  actually	  being	  granted	  access,	  and	  thus	  how	  to	  identify	  and	  respond	  to	  insider	  
threat.	  This	  may	  in	  part	  explain	  why	  federated	  access	  is	  not	  widely	  deployed	  today.	  
This	  paper	  claims	  that	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructures	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  identifying	  
abnormal	  behavior,	  and	  autonomously	  change	  authorization	  assets	  (authorization	  constraints	  /	  
subject	  privileges)	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  and	  mitigate	  misuse	  of	  access	  (insider	  threat).	  In	  a	  previous	  
paper	  [9],	  we	  have	  introduced	  the	  conceptual	  design	  of	  a	  Self-­‐Adaptive	  Authorization	  Framework	  
(SAAF)	  for	  monitoring,	  analyzing,	  planning	  and	  executing	  required	  adaptations	  for	  managing	  a	  
federated	  authorization	  infrastructure,	  depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  misuse	  of	  access	  rights.	  	  The	  novel	  
aspect	  of	  this	  paper	  builds	  on	  our	  previous	  work	  through	  the	  detailed	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  
a	  prototype	  SAAF	  controller,	  highlighting	  the	  controller’s	  key	  phases	  and	  use	  of	  models	  for	  managing	  
authorization	  infrastructures.	  We	  detail	  the	  design	  and	  generation	  of	  these	  models	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
SAAF	  controller’s	  feedback	  loop,	  along	  with	  adaptation	  scenarios	  in	  which	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  is	  
deployed.	  Other	  contributions	  of	  this	  paper	  are	  the	  effective	  integration	  of	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  with	  
a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure;	  comprising	  a	  PERMIS	  standalone	  authorization	  server	  and	  
SAML	  based	  service	  and	  identity	  providers,	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  overall	  feasibility	  of	  SAAF.	  	  
The	  rest	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  In	  Section	  2,	  we	  describe	  the	  domain	  model	  of	  
federated	  authorization	  infrastructures,	  and	  the	  conceptual	  design	  of	  SAAF.	  Section	  3	  outlines	  the	  
SAAF	  controller	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  key	  components	  and	  the	  models	  used.	  Section	  4	  describes	  the	  SAAF	  
controller	  prototype,	  which	  was	  deployed	  in	  a	  self-­‐adaptive	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  
In	  Section	  5,	  we	  present	  an	  abnormal	  usage	  scenario	  and	  evaluate	  how	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  manages	  
and	  compare	  the	  results	  to	  current	  technology.	  In	  Section	  6,	  we	  discuss	  current	  related	  work	  in	  
comparison	  to	  SAAF.	  Finally,	  Section	  7	  concludes	  with	  an	  evaluation	  of	  our	  work	  and	  indicates	  where	  
future	  work	  is	  still	  required.	  
2. Self-­‐Adaptive	  Authorization	  Framework	  
In	  this	  paper,	  we	  refer	  to	  our	  Self-­‐Adaptive	  Authorization	  Framework	  (SAAF)	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  
being	  attached	  to	  policy	  based	  RBAC/ABAC	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructures.	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  
integrate	  with	  current	  authorization	  infrastructures,	  such	  as	  PERMIS	  [10],	  Shibboleth	  [11],	  and	  
XACML	  [12]	  in	  order	  to	  make	  them	  adaptable	  and	  self-­‐managing,	  rather	  than	  designing	  an	  entirely	  
new	  type	  of	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  SAAF’s	  objective	  is	  to	  autonomously	  monitor	  the	  usage	  of	  
an	  existing	  authorization	  infrastructure,	  make	  judgments	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  subject	  interactions	  (in	  
the	  form	  of	  authorization	  requests	  and	  decisions),	  and	  adapt	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  
accordingly.	  SAAF	  is	  reactive,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  monitors	  the	  use	  of	  a	  target	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  by	  subjects	  in	  order	  to	  detect	  abnormal	  behavior.	  Abnormal	  behavior	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  
set	  of	  rules	  that	  capture	  conditions	  that	  exhibit	  insider	  threat	  in	  the	  deployment	  environment	  of	  
SAAF.	  Once	  abnormal	  behavior	  is	  detected	  a	  decision	  is	  made	  on	  whether	  to	  adapt	  the	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  or	  not.	  	  
The	  following	  section	  describes	  in	  detail	  the	  expected	  target	  domain	  that	  SAAF	  can	  manage,	  
along	  with	  SAAF’s	  conceptual	  design.	  
2.1. Target	  Domain:	  Federated	  Authorization	  Infrastructures	  
SAAF’s	  target	  domain	  identifies	  what	  services	  can	  exist,	  which	  services	  are	  configurable,	  what	  can	  
be	  monitored,	  and	  how	  access	  is	  requested	  and	  granted,	  within	  a	  federated	  authorization	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infrastructure.	  As	  SAAF	  is	  designed	  for	  the	  management	  of	  RBAC/ABAC	  authorization	  models,	  the	  
domain	  model	  is	  specific	  to	  these	  authorization	  models.	  
Role	  based	  access	  control	  (RBAC)	  and	  its	  more	  generic	  variant	  attribute	  based	  access	  control	  
(ABAC)	  are	  models	  of	  authorization,	  facilitating	  access	  to	  protected	  resources	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
roles/attributes	  and	  by	  assigning	  permissions	  to	  those	  roles/attributes.	  A	  set	  of	  rules	  exist	  which	  
state	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  subject	  to	  access	  a	  resource	  (e.g.	  ‘Read	  Database’),	  the	  subject	  must	  have	  a	  
specific	  set	  of	  roles	  or	  attributes	  (e.g.	  Role	  of	  Staff).	  The	  RBAC/ABAC	  authorization	  model	  can	  be	  
extended	  to	  include:	  hierarchy	  of	  roles/attributes,	  static	  separation	  of	  duties,	  dynamic	  separation	  of	  
duties	  and	  arbitrary	  conditions.	  Our	  work	  is	  focused	  initially	  on	  core	  RBAC/ABAC	  over	  a	  distributed	  
federated	  implementation.	  
A	  federated	  RBAC/ABAC	  authorization	  infrastructure,	  as	  implemented	  in	  [10]	  [11]	  [12],	  comprises	  
the	  following	  components:	  	  -­‐ a	  set	  of	  distributed	  role/attribute	  issuing	  authorities	  (AAs),	  also	  known	  as	  Identity	  Providers	  
(IdPs),	  which	  assign	  digitally	  signed	  credentials	  to	  subjects	  in	  a	  session,	  	  -­‐ a	  Credential	  Validation	  Service	  (CVS)	  at	  the	  Service	  Provider’s	  (SP)	  site,	  which	  validates	  the	  
roles/attributes	  issued	  to	  the	  subject	  as	  credentials	  [13],	  and	  	  -­‐ a	  Policy	  Decision	  Point	  (PDP)	  also	  at	  the	  SP’s	  site,	  which	  evaluates	  if	  these	  roles/attributes	  give	  
the	  user	  sufficient	  permission	  to	  access	  the	  requested	  resource.	  	  
Through	  the	  use	  of	  policies,	  attributes	  and	  credentials,	  subject	  authorization	  is	  provided.	  We	  
refer	  to	  these	  as	  ‘assets’	  of	  a	  federated	  RBAC/ABAC	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  These	  assets	  
demonstrate	  the	  parts	  of	  an	  authorization	  infrastructure	  that	  are	  changeable	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  
modified	  through	  self-­‐adaptation	  to	  impact	  future	  authorization	  decisions.	  
Figure	  1	  shows	  a	  simplified	  view	  of	  SAAF’s	  target	  domain	  model.	  It	  shows	  the	  three	  types	  of	  
service	  required	  for	  effective	  federated	  authorization,	  along	  with	  the	  assets	  used	  to	  define	  the	  
control	  and	  input/output	  of	  such	  services.	  Services	  can	  be	  categorized	  as	  Service	  Provider	  (SP)	  
services	  (Credential	  Validation	  Service	  and	  Policy	  Decision	  Point),	  and	  Identity	  Provider	  (IdP)	  
services.	  
The	  target	  domain	  model	  has	  six	  assets	  that	  are	  manageable.	  These	  are	  the	  attributes,	  
credentials,	  and	  valid	  attributes	  assigned	  to	  the	  subjects;	  and	  the	  Credential	  Issuing	  Policy,	  
Credential	  Validation	  Policy	  and	  Access	  Control	  Policy,	  collectively	  referred	  to	  as	  Authorization	  
Policies	  (AZPs).	  A	  7th	  (unmanageable)	  asset	  is	  a	  log	  of	  the	  access	  requests	  and	  access	  decisions.	  This	  
can	  be	  observed	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  usage	  statistics	  and	  a	  history	  of	  access	  requests.	  
Through	  changing	  the	  subject’s	  attributes	  or	  the	  credential	  issuing	  policy	  we	  control	  what	  
credentials	  may	  be	  issued,	  thus	  potentially	  increasing	  or	  reducing	  the	  subject’s	  permissions.	  The	  
revocation	  of	  credentials	  allows	  for	  the	  termination	  of	  access	  sessions	  midway.	  Through	  the	  
adaptation/switching	  of	  any	  of	  the	  authorization	  policies,	  SAAF	  is	  able	  to	  impact	  a	  group	  of	  subjects	  
by	  controlling	  authorization	  at	  a	  higher	  level.	  The	  authorization	  infrastructure	  interprets	  these	  assets	  
in	  order	  to	  provide	  access	  control	  decisions.	  The	  modification	  of	  these	  assets	  by	  SAAF	  impacts	  the	  
access	  control	  decision	  thus	  preventing	  abnormal	  behavior.	  
In	  order	  for	  an	  implementation	  of	  the	  target	  domain	  model	  to	  be	  manageable	  by	  SAAF,	  we	  make	  
the	  following	  assumptions:	  -­‐ the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  is	  capable	  of	  generating	  logs	  of	  its	  actions,	  e.g.,	  failed	  and	  
successful	  access	  requests,	  and	  that	  these	  logs	  are	  available	  to	  be	  read	  by	  SAAF;	  	  	  -­‐ the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  has	  interfaces	  that	  allow	  it	  to	  receive	  new	  policies	  or	  replace	  old	  
ones	  currently	  in	  use,	  and	  that	  SAAF	  can	  access	  these	  interfaces;	  -­‐ identity	  providers	  are	  capable	  of	  allowing	  SAAF	  to	  modify	  the	  subject	  attribute	  assignments,	  but	  
if	  this	  is	  not	  possible	  then	  	  -­‐ identity	  providers	  are	  capable	  of	  accepting	  notifications	  (from	  SAAF)	  about	  their	  subject	  
attribute	  mis-­‐assignments	  and	  cases	  of	  abuse,	  and	  are	  willing	  to	  remove	  and	  add	  new	  attributes	  
to	  their	  subjects	  and	  notify	  SAAF	  when	  the	  requested	  changes	  have	  been	  effected.	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Figure	  1.	  Domain	  Model	  for	  Federated	  RBAC/ABAC	  Infrastructures	  
2.2. SAAF	  Conceptual	  Design	  
SAAF	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Monitor-­‐Analyze-­‐Plan-­‐Execute-­‐Knowledge	  (MAPE-­‐K)	  reference	  model	  [14]	  
adapting	  assets	  associated	  with	  a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  The	  conceptual	  design	  
(Figure	  2)	  identifies	  two	  major	  components,	  the	  SAAF	  controller,	  which	  utilizes	  a	  feedback	  loop	  [15],	  
and	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  (the	  target,	  which	  conforms	  to	  SAAF’s	  target	  domain	  model).	  	  
The	  Monitor	  is	  a	  simple	  component	  that	  retrieves	  assets	  of	  the	  federated	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  via	  system	  Probes,	  and	  updates	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model	  and	  behavior	  
model.	  For	  example	  it	  captures	  an	  access	  request	  and	  corresponding	  authorization	  decision,	  and	  
updates	  the	  behavior	  statistics	  within	  the	  behavior	  model	  (representing	  knowledge	  of	  usage	  within	  
the	  target	  system),	  as	  well	  as	  subject-­‐attribute	  relationships	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  
model.	  The	  monitor	  uses	  triggers	  to	  identify	  exactly	  what	  statistics	  are	  required	  for	  the	  behavior	  
model	  (and	  trigger	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation).	  	  
The	  Analyzer’s	  objective	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  behavior	  model,	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  if	  abnormal	  behavior	  
has	  taken	  place	  and	  identify	  possible	  solutions	  that	  may	  prevent	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  from	  
continuing.	  As	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  MAPE-­‐K	  reference	  model,	  we	  introduce	  the	  need	  to	  analyze	  
possible	  solutions	  within	  the	  analyzer,	  as	  solution	  analysis	  is	  highly	  correlated	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  
abnormal	  behavior.	  The	  set	  of	  identified	  solutions	  is	  then	  sent	  to	  the	  planner.	  These	  solutions	  
encapsulate	  actions	  that	  modify	  rules	  belonging	  to	  authorization	  policies,	  and	  individual	  subjects’	  
attributes	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  abnormal	  behavior.	  	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  Planner	  is	  to	  select	  the	  most	  relevant	  solution	  to	  solve	  the	  identified	  abnormal	  
behavior.	  The	  selected	  solution	  is	  transformed	  into	  an	  executable	  plan	  that	  is	  sent	  to	  the	  executor,	  
such	  as,	  generate	  a	  new	  access	  control	  policy	  then	  request	  the	  authorization	  service	  to	  activate	  the	  
new	  policy.	  	  
The	  Executor	  adapts	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  plan,	  via	  Effectors.	  
These	  effectors	  enable	  the	  adaptation	  of	  authorization	  services	  and	  their	  assets,	  and	  provide	  an	  
interface	  to	  SAAF	  to	  execute	  commands	  on	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  	  
The	  target	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  is	  an	  implementation	  of	  the	  SAAF	  target	  
domain	  model	  (Figure	  1).	  It	  conforms	  to	  the	  domain	  model	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  deployed	  services	  and	  
assets	  are	  an	  instantiation	  of	  the	  types	  of	  services	  and	  assets	  present	  in	  the	  domain	  model.	  There	  
can	  be	  multiple	  instances	  of	  authorization	  services	  and	  assets.	  For	  example,	  there	  may	  be	  several	  
Identity	  Providers	  (IdPs)	  within	  one	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  An	  implementation	  of	  
the	  target	  domain	  model	  does	  not	  have	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  domain	  model	  completely,	  whereby	  only	  
a	  subset	  of	  authorization	  services	  need	  exist	  (e.g.,	  no	  configurable	  Credential	  Issuing	  Policy).	  In	  these	  
cases	  SAAF	  is	  still	  able	  to	  manage	  authorization,	  yet	  management	  decisions	  are	  restricted	  to	  the	  
scope	  of	  what	  can	  be	  controlled	  and	  monitored.	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Figure	  2.	  SAAF	  Conceptual	  Design	  
3. SAAF	  Controller	  
We	  demonstrate	  SAAF	  as	  an	  autonomic	  controller	  (Figure	  3)	  that	  conforms	  to	  the	  conceptual	  
design	  of	  SAAF.	  	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  continuous	  cycle,	  whereby	  the	  monitor	  (Behavior	  
Gauges	  and	  Asset	  Monitor)	  constantly	  update	  a	  model	  that	  represents	  the	  rules	  and	  access	  rights	  
assignments	  within	  the	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  (authorization	  infrastructure	  model),	  
as	  well	  as	  a	  data	  model	  that	  captures	  statistics	  about	  the	  use	  of	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  
(Behavior	  Model).	  Whilst	  the	  models	  are	  being	  updated,	  the	  Analyzer	  searches	  for	  abnormal	  
behavior.	  Once	  abnormal	  behavior	  is	  identified,	  it	  attempts	  to	  solve	  this	  by	  producing	  tailored	  
solutions.	  The	  tailored	  solutions	  are	  passed	  to	  the	  Planner,	  which	  together	  with	  the	  Executor	  realize	  
the	  solution.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  discuss	  the	  operation	  of	  each	  component	  of	  the	  controller	  in	  detail	  
and	  how	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  manages	  a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  SAAF	  Controller	  Architecture	  and	  Interfaces	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3.1. SAAF	  Controller	  Models	  
The	  SAAF	  controller	  relies	  on	  models	  to	  facilitate	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  Analyzer,	  Planner,	  and	  
Executor	  components.	  These	  models	  breakdown	  into	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model,	  which	  
stores	  information	  about	  authorization	  assets	  (Figure	  1)	  active	  in	  the	  target	  system,	  and	  the	  
behavior	  model,	  which	  provides	  statistics	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  authorization	  assets.	  
The	  Authorization	  Infrastructure	  Model	  (Figure	  4)	  provides	  constructs	  of	  RBAC/ABAC	  rules,	  such	  
as	  attribute-­‐permission	  assignments	  {Attribute,	  {Target,	  Action}},	  identity	  provider-­‐attribute	  
assignments	  {Identity	  Provider,	  Attribute},	  and	  subject-­‐attribute	  assignments	  	  {{Subject,	  Attribute},	  
Identity	  Provider}.	  Previous	  research	  has	  already	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  universal	  construct	  for	  
RBAC/ABAC	  system	  policies	  [16].	  These	  constructs	  represent	  a	  generic	  view	  of	  the	  managed	  
federated	  authorization	  infrastructure’s	  active	  authorization	  policies	  and	  subject-­‐attribute	  
assignments.	  This	  allows	  SAAF	  to	  assess	  and	  validate	  adaptations,	  as	  well	  as	  identify	  what	  specific	  
constructs	  must	  be	  adapted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  abnormal	  behavior.	  A	  key	  feature	  of	  the	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  model	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  SAAF	  to	  adapt	  at	  the	  model	  level,	  whereby	  the	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  model	  is	  modified	  and	  then	  realized	  through	  the	  generation	  of	  new	  implementation	  
specific	  authorization	  policies.	  These	  policies	  can	  then	  be	  activated	  within	  the	  target	  authorization	  
services	  to	  impact	  future	  authorization	  decisions	  and	  prevent	  further	  abnormal	  behavior.	  	  
The	  Behavior	  Model	  is	  a	  data	  model	  of	  usage	  statistics	  about	  existing	  relationships	  within	  the	  
authorization	  infrastructure	  model	  that	  may	  be	  adapted.	  It	  is	  populated	  by	  the	  assessment	  of	  access	  
requests	  and	  decisions	  made	  within	  the	  target	  authorization	  infrastructure.	  The	  statistics	  captured	  
within	  the	  behavior	  model	  are	  directly	  associated	  to	  the	  relationships	  within	  the	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  model,	  such	  as	  {Attribute,	  Target,	  Action}	  or	  {Subject,	  Identity	  Provider,	  Attribute,	  
Target,	  Action}.	  These	  relationships	  contain	  statistical	  properties	  such	  as,	  the	  rate	  of	  access	  requests	  
that	  a	  subject	  from	  an	  IdP	  has	  accessed	  {Target,	  Action}.	  Statistical	  properties	  allow	  for	  statements	  
of	  usage	  to	  be	  drawn	  about	  subjects,	  roles/attributes,	  and	  permissions	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  
For	  example,	  the	  average	  frequencies	  of	  requests	  by	  attribute	  A,	  or	  subject	  S	  to	  read	  target	  T	  per	  
minute	  during	  the	  last	  30	  days.	  This	  enables	  SAAF	  to	  identify	  how	  subjects	  are	  using	  the	  system	  
collectively.	  Note	  that	  in	  the	  current	  implementation	  we	  only	  indirectly	  capture	  the	  results	  of	  the	  
credential	  validation	  process	  through	  monitoring	  the	  access	  request.	  Consequently	  we	  do	  not	  record	  
all	  the	  attributes	  that	  the	  IdP	  has	  assigned	  to	  the	  subject	  (as	  credentials),	  only	  valid	  attributes.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4.	  Authorization	  Infrastructure	  Model	  
3.2. Monitor	  
The	  SAAF	  monitor	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  behavior	  gauges	  and	  an	  asset	  monitor,	  responsible	  for	  
updating	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  models.	  The	  monitor	  relies	  on	  system	  probes	  that	  exist	  within	  the	  
target	  system	  (a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure).	  Authorization	  service	  ‘policy’	  probes	  detect	  
when	  a	  policy	  has	  been	  changed	  or	  a	  new	  policy	  activated	  within	  a	  particular	  service.	  Authorization	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service	  ‘access’	  probes	  detect	  when	  new	  access	  requests	  have	  been	  made,	  typically	  when	  the	  policy	  
decision	  point	  service	  has	  updated	  its	  access	  logs.	  The	  monitor	  uses	  a	  set	  of	  pre-­‐defined	  triggers	  for	  
activating	  adaptation	  when	  abnormal	  behavior	  is	  identified.	  
3.2.1. Triggers	  
Each	  trigger	  describes	  a	  relationship	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model	  {Subject,	  
Identity	  Provider,	  Attribute,	  Target,	  Action},	  along	  with	  a	  set	  of	  conditions,	  such	  as	  rate	  of	  access	  
requests	  that	  conform	  to	  this	  relationship,	  over	  a	  given	  time	  interval.	  There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  
triggers,	  base	  triggers	  and	  composite	  triggers.	  Base	  triggers	  use	  data	  within	  the	  behavior	  model	  to	  
trigger	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation.	  For	  example,	  a	  base	  trigger	  activates	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation	  when	  
a	  subject	  accesses	  a	  resource	  more	  than	  5	  times	  per	  minute	  interval.	  Composite	  triggers	  are	  
composed	  of	  base	  triggers,	  to	  detect	  when	  multiple	  trigger	  conditions	  have	  been	  met	  over	  a	  set	  
amount	  of	  occurrences	  and	  time.	  For	  example,	  a	  composite	  trigger	  activates	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation	  
when	  multiple	  subjects,	  from	  multiple	  identity	  providers,	  all	  access	  a	  resource	  more	  than	  5	  times	  per	  
minute	  interval	  in	  a	  30-­‐day	  period.	  
3.2.2. Updating	  the	  Authorization	  Infrastructure	  Model	  	  
Activated	  policies	  that	  have	  been	  detected	  by	  relevant	  system	  probes	  undergo	  a	  process	  of	  
model	  transformation	  [17]	  within	  the	  asset	  monitor.	  Each	  policy	  document	  represents	  a	  model	  of	  
rules	  for	  the	  desired	  authorization	  service.	  In	  order	  for	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  to	  understand	  a	  policy,	  
the	  policy	  must	  undergo	  model	  transformation.	  Model	  transformation	  allows	  the	  conversion	  of	  
implementation	  specific	  formats	  (i.e.,	  XACML	  or	  PERMIS	  proprietary	  schema’s	  [10]),	  to	  the	  generic	  
RBAC/ABAC	  view	  that	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  can	  interrogate	  and	  use,	  as	  described	  in	  Section	  3.1.	  	  The	  
authorization	  infrastructure	  model	  may	  hold	  multiple	  modeled	  active	  policies,	  requiring	  that	  each	  
modeled	  policy	  is	  labeled	  with	  meta-­‐information	  to	  provide	  ownership	  and	  location	  data	  that	  is	  
required	  when	  generating	  new	  policies	  as	  part	  of	  adaptations.	  Whenever	  an	  active	  policy	  is	  changed,	  
the	  modeled	  policy,	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model,	  is	  remodeled.	  	  
Subject-­‐attribute	  assignments	  are	  also	  modeled	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model.	  
This	  allows	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  what	  subjects	  have	  which	  valid	  attributes,	  when	  
forming	  adaptations.	  Unlike	  authorization	  policies,	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  does	  not	  have	  a	  complete	  
view	  of	  all	  subject-­‐attribute	  assignments,	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  how	  these	  assignments	  are	  stored	  (in	  
multiple	  identity	  providers)	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  credential	  validation	  logs	  are	  not	  interrogated.	  
Therefore	  only	  valid	  attribute	  assignments	  are	  captured	  through	  monitoring	  access	  control	  requests	  
(which	  provide	  a	  subject’s	  identifying	  ID,	  valid	  attributes,	  the	  target	  resource	  being	  accessed	  and	  the	  
action	  requested)	  and	  access	  decisions.	  In	  addition,	  identity	  providers	  can	  push	  attribute	  changes	  to	  
the	  SAAF	  controller;	  however	  this	  is	  only	  as	  confirmation	  of	  successful	  adaptations	  against	  subject-­‐
attribute	  assignments.	  
3.2.3. Updating	  the	  Behavior	  Model	  
The	  behavior	  model	  is	  updated	  through	  the	  processing	  of	  logged	  access	  requests/decisions,	  and	  
generation	  of	  statistics	  by	  a	  set	  of	  behavior	  gauges.	  Behavior	  gauges	  present	  a	  means	  of	  collecting	  
specific	  statistics	  about	  relationships	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model.	  For	  each	  access	  
request	  and	  decision	  that	  is	  logged,	  the	  relevant	  behavior	  gauges	  update	  statistics	  about	  existing	  
relationships	  within	  the	  behavior	  model,	  which	  in	  turn	  drive	  adaptation	  (Figure	  5).	  Gauges	  are	  based	  
entirely	  on	  triggers,	  and	  for	  each	  trigger	  there	  exists	  a	  set	  of	  gauges,	  depending	  on	  how	  many	  
observed	  relationships	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model	  match	  the	  trigger.	  For	  example,	  
if	  there	  are	  20	  subjects	  that	  meet	  the	  set	  of	  relationships	  defined	  by	  the	  trigger	  <any	  subject,	  from	  
any	  identity	  provider,	  accessing	  action	  ‘print’	  on	  target	  ‘printer’	  with	  attribute	  ‘role=staff’>,	  then	  
there	  are	  at	  least	  20	  gauges	  required	  for	  that	  trigger.	  If	  a	  gauge	  does	  not	  exist,	  yet	  the	  relationship	  
observed	  in	  the	  access	  request	  matches	  a	  trigger,	  then	  a	  new	  gauge	  is	  created.	  If	  gauges	  already	  
exist	  for	  the	  observed	  relationship,	  then	  the	  gauges	  are	  updated.	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In	  accordance	  with	  the	  two	  types	  of	  trigger,	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  gauge:	  a	  gauge	  that	  generates	  
statistics	  for	  base	  triggers,	  and	  a	  gauge	  that	  generates	  statistics	  for	  composite	  triggers.	  Both	  types	  of	  
gauge	  operate	  as	  described	  previously,	  with	  the	  only	  exception	  that	  composite	  gauges	  are	  updated	  
as	  gauges	  belonging	  to	  base	  triggers	  become	  full	  (indicating	  multiple	  base	  trigger	  conditions	  have	  
been	  met).	  Once	  either	  type	  of	  gauge	  becomes	  full,	  based	  on	  trigger	  conditions,	  abnormal	  behavior	  
has	  been	  identified	  and	  is	  sent	  as	  a	  snapshot	  of	  behavior	  to	  the	  analyzer.	  
	  
Figure	  5.	  Gauge	  generation	  
3.3. Analyzer	  
The	  analyzer	  component	  fulfills	  two	  purposes,	  related	  to	  1)	  analyzing	  misbehavior	  in	  order	  to	  
identify	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation,	  and	  2)	  analyze	  what	  solutions	  are	  applicable	  to	  solving	  the	  
misbehavior.	  
3.3.1. Behavior	  Analysis	  
The	  analyzer	  identifies	  the	  problem	  that	  caused	  behavior	  gauges	  to	  meet	  trigger	  conditions,	  
through	  behavior	  analysis.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  gauge	  measures	  the	  number	  of	  times	  a	  file	  has	  been	  
retrieved	  per	  minute	  and	  it	  triggers	  when	  10	  retrievals	  per	  minute	  have	  been	  recorded,	  the	  analyzer	  
needs	  to	  determine	  if	  this	  is	  the	  same	  subject	  retrieving	  the	  file	  10	  times,	  or	  10	  different	  subjects	  
doing	  the	  same	  thing	  once,	  since	  the	  solution	  to	  either	  scenario	  may	  be	  different.	  The	  analyzer	  must	  
therefore	  first	  determine	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  that	  took	  place	  before	  finding	  
the	  relevant	  solution(s)	  and	  tailoring	  it	  (them)	  to	  the	  specific	  conditions	  of	  the	  abnormal	  behavior,	  in	  
order	  to	  prevent	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  from	  continuing.	  
3.3.2. Solution	  Analysis	  
For	  any	  given	  abnormal	  behavior	  there	  can	  be	  a	  set	  of	  relevant	  parameterized	  solutions,	  which	  
prevent	  that	  behavior	  from	  continuing.	  Solutions	  may	  exist	  in	  the	  form	  of	  alternative	  rules	  that	  are	  
capable	  of	  preventing	  the	  identified	  abnormal	  behavior	  (e.g.,	  remove	  subject	  attribute	  or	  remove	  
attribute	  permission).	  Solutions	  are	  further	  defined	  by	  a	  set	  of	  actions	  (such	  as	  ‘remove	  ABAC	  
constraint’,	  ‘activate	  policy’)	  and	  are	  reusable	  by	  other	  solutions.	  There	  are	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  
actions	  possible	  for	  a	  solution.	  These	  are	  all	  actions	  applicable	  to	  the	  controllable	  assets	  described	  in	  
SAAF’s	  target	  domain	  model.	  	  
Solution	  analysis	  interprets	  relevant	  solutions	  from	  the	  set	  of	  pre-­‐defined	  solutions	  for	  the	  
identified	  abnormal	  behavior	  (trigger).	  The	  analysis	  to	  be	  performed	  relies	  on	  the	  variables	  defined	  
by	  the	  identified	  behavior.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  permission	  was	  misused	  by	  a	  subject	  (or	  attribute),	  the	  
analysis	  would	  be	  focused	  around	  that	  subject,	  that	  attribute	  and	  that	  permission.	  As	  solutions	  are	  
parameterized,	  the	  actions	  stated	  for	  each	  applicable	  solution	  must	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  identified	  
behavior,	  using	  modeled	  constructs	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model.	  An	  instance	  of	  
each	  relevant	  solution	  and	  action	  is	  created,	  and	  tailored	  to	  match.	  For	  example,	  a	  solution	  instance	  
is	  tailored	  to	  the	  subject’s	  behavior	  that	  caused	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation,	  including	  the	  attribute	  
used,	  and	  the	  identity	  provider	  that	  assigned	  the	  attribute.	  Each	  applicable	  solution	  is	  tailored	  in	  this	  
manner,	  and	  sent	  as	  a	  set	  to	  the	  planner	  component.	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The	  planner	  component	  fulfills	  two	  purposes,	  the	  selection	  of	  an	  ideal	  solution,	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
weighted	  calculation	  of	  impact,	  from	  the	  set	  of	  solutions	  provided	  by	  the	  analyzer,	  and	  the	  
generation	  of	  an	  executable	  plan.	  
3.4.1. Solution	  Selection	  
Selecting	  an	  ideal	  solution	  is	  critical	  to	  ensuring	  only	  necessary	  adaptations	  take	  place,	  as	  
solutions	  vary	  in	  terms	  of	  severity	  and	  risk,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  context	  the	  authorization	  
infrastructure	  is	  deployed	  in.	  Whilst	  each	  trigger	  specifies	  the	  condition	  of	  a	  particular	  abnormal	  
state,	  the	  existing	  triggers	  lack	  the	  definition	  of	  any	  impact	  or	  loss	  of	  utility	  that	  the	  abnormal	  
behavior	  might	  have.	  We	  recognize	  the	  need	  for	  a	  multi-­‐attribute	  function	  to	  produce	  a	  utility	  [18]	  
or	  impact	  value	  for	  each	  solution,	  yet	  for	  implementation	  purposes	  this	  utility	  is	  simply	  calculated	  on	  
a	  single	  dimension,	  weight	  of	  impact.	  The	  weight	  of	  impact	  represents	  the	  number	  of	  subjects	  who	  
have	  caused	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  having	  their	  access	  rights	  removed,	  against	  the	  number	  of	  
subjects	  who	  have	  not	  caused	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  having	  their	  access	  rights	  removed	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  solution.	  The	  former	  must	  outweigh	  the	  latter	  for	  adaptation	  to	  take	  place.	  In	  
other	  words,	  adaptation	  will	  only	  take	  place	  if	  more	  offending	  subjects	  can	  be	  impacted	  than	  non-­‐
offending	  subjects.	  
For	  the	  set	  of	  solutions	  received	  by	  the	  planner,	  each	  solution	  is	  ordered	  by	  this	  weight	  of	  impact.	  
For	  example,	  if	  a	  subject	  misuses	  their	  access	  rights	  to	  a	  printer,	  a	  solution	  may	  be	  to	  modify	  the	  
policy	  where	  the	  attribute	  required	  to	  access	  the	  printer	  is	  no	  longer	  valid.	  However,	  the	  weight	  
associated	  with	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  many	  subjects	  are	  impacted	  rather	  than	  just	  the	  offending	  
subject.	  A	  more	  relevant	  solution	  might	  be	  to	  request	  the	  identity	  provider	  (IdP)	  to	  remove	  the	  
subject’s	  attribute.	  	  
3.4.2. Plan	  Generation	  
Plan	  generation	  identifies	  what	  actions	  need	  to	  be	  performed	  for	  realizing	  the	  chosen	  solution.	  It	  
can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  automatically	  generated	  set	  of	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  instructions	  with	  specific	  details	  on	  
how	  to	  execute	  an	  adaptation	  [19].	  In	  the	  current	  implementation	  the	  actions	  are	  pre-­‐defined	  in	  the	  
solutions	  policy.	  For	  each	  action	  attached	  to	  the	  chosen	  solution,	  the	  planner	  includes	  meta-­‐
information	  to	  enable	  execution.	  If	  it	  is	  an	  action	  against	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model,	  the	  
planner	  identifies	  the	  specific	  relationship	  that	  must	  change,	  including	  ownership	  information	  
regarding	  the	  actual	  authorization	  services	  and	  identity	  providers.	  Actions	  are	  ordered	  in	  stages	  of	  
execution,	  whereby	  changes	  to	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model	  are	  made	  first,	  followed	  by	  
generation	  of	  new	  assets	  (such	  as	  policies),	  then	  instructions	  to	  system	  effectors	  (activate	  policy,	  
remove	  attribute	  assignment).	  
3.5. Executor	  
The	  executor	  component	  is	  a	  simple	  component	  that	  executes	  a	  plan	  generated	  by	  the	  planner.	  
Each	  action	  the	  executor	  attempts	  to	  execute	  is	  idempotent,	  therefore	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  attempt	  to	  
make	  a	  request	  to	  an	  external	  effector	  until	  the	  action	  is	  successful	  or	  a	  time	  out	  limit	  is	  met.	  The	  
outcome	  of	  a	  plan	  execution	  either	  results	  in	  a	  successful	  or	  failed	  plan.	  Successful	  plans	  are	  
characterized	  by	  the	  positive	  response	  from	  all	  the	  external	  system	  effectors.	  Unsuccessful	  plans	  are	  
characterized	  by	  either	  an	  error	  message	  or	  a	  failure	  to	  respond	  by	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  external	  
system	  effectors.	  	  
Upon	  completion	  of	  a	  plan,	  successful	  or	  not,	  system	  probes	  update	  the	  SAAF	  controller’s	  
monitor	  components	  with	  a	  new	  view	  of	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure,	  maintaining	  a	  consistent	  
view	  of	  what	  is	  modeled,	  to	  what	  is	  actually	  present	  in	  terms	  of	  rules	  and	  subject-­‐attribute	  
assignments.	  	  
4. SAAF	  Deployment	  
This	  section	  describes	  the	  deployment	  of	  a	  self-­‐adaptive	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure,	  
which	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6.	  The	  self-­‐adaptive	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  comprises	  an	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authorization	  server	  made	  up	  of	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  and	  PERMIS	  standalone	  authorization	  service	  
[10],	  a	  service	  provider	  that	  provides	  resources	  for	  federated	  subjects	  to	  request	  access	  to,	  and	  two	  
identity	  providers	  that	  maintain	  subject-­‐attribute	  assignments	  for	  federated	  subjects	  belonging	  to	  
two	  different	  organizations.	  The	  self-­‐adaptive	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  is	  deployed	  
across	  several	  virtual	  machines	  within	  a	  local	  area	  network.	  Basic	  system	  effectors	  and	  probes	  have	  
been	  implemented	  to	  facilitate	  SAAF’s	  controller	  interfaces,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3	  and	  Figure	  6,	  
however	  they	  will	  not	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Architecture	  of	  the	  Self-­‐Adaptive	  Federated	  Authorization	  Infrastructure	  
4.1. Authorization	  Server	  
The	  authorization	  server	  runs	  on	  a	  VMware	  virtual	  machine,	  with	  Ubuntu	  v10.10,	  1GB	  memory.	  
The	  virtual	  machine	  is	  hosted	  on	  a	  MacBook	  pro	  (OS	  X	  Lion)	  2.4GHz,	  4GB	  memory.	  	  The	  
authorization	  server	  contains	  a	  deployment	  of	  PERMIS	  as	  a	  standalone	  server,	  and	  an	  
implementation	  of	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  described	  in	  Section	  3.	  The	  PERMIS	  standalone	  encapsulates	  
a	  credential	  validation	  service	  (CVS)	  and	  policy	  decision	  point	  (PDP)	  for	  generating	  access	  decisions	  
based	  on	  a	  single	  authorization	  policy.	  The	  authorization	  policy	  provides	  rules	  on	  credential	  
validation	  as	  well	  as	  RBAC	  constraints,	  which	  can	  be	  broken	  up	  into	  the	  credential	  validation	  policy	  
and	  access	  control	  policy	  described	  in	  Section	  2.1.	  The	  PERMIS	  standalone	  receives	  Simple	  Object	  
Access	  Protocol	  (SOAP)	  messages	  that	  define	  a	  subject’s	  access	  request,	  over	  an	  SSL	  connection.	  The	  
contents	  of	  the	  SOAP	  message	  are	  assessed	  for	  valid	  attributes	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  valid	  
attributes	  fulfill	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  requested	  access.	  The	  sender	  of	  the	  SOAP	  message,	  a	  
resource’s	  policy	  enforcement	  point	  (PEP),	  then	  receives	  a	  SOAP	  response	  containing	  an	  access	  
decision,	  either:	  grant,	  deny,	  or	  not	  applicable.	  The	  PEP	  can	  use	  this	  value	  to	  allow	  the	  subject	  
requestor	  access	  to	  the	  resource.	  All	  access	  requests	  and	  decisions	  are	  logged,	  recording	  the	  actions	  
made	  by	  the	  CVS	  and	  PDP.	  	  
The	  deployment	  of	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  was	  implemented	  in	  Java,	  and	  installed	  on	  the	  same	  
server	  as	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone	  authorization	  server.	  Models	  within	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  are	  
populated	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  Java	  objects,	  and	  relational	  records	  are	  stored	  in	  a	  locally	  accessible	  
MySQL	  database.	  In	  particular,	  policies	  modeled	  within	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  model,	  
stored	  as	  Java	  objects,	  are	  populated	  through	  model	  transformation	  with	  a	  tool	  generated	  using	  the	  
Eclipse	  EMF	  modeling	  framework	  [20].	  Behavior	  statistics	  are	  populated	  and	  stored	  as	  Java	  objects	  
within	  the	  SAAF	  controller’s	  run-­‐time	  memory.	  Subject-­‐attribute	  assignments	  are	  populated	  and	  
stored	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relational	  records	  within	  the	  MySQL	  database.	  The	  controller’s	  triggers	  and	  
	  
To	  appear	  in	  the	  Journal of Computer and System Sciences  




solutions	  are	  written	  in	  XML,	  stored	  on	  the	  server’s	  file	  system	  as	  XML	  documents.	  These	  XML	  
documents	  represent	  a	  ‘behavior	  policy’	  and	  ‘solutions	  policy’	  and	  are	  parsed	  when	  the	  SAAF	  
controller	  is	  first	  initialized.	  Communications	  between	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  and	  its	  managed	  services	  
are	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways:	  through	  the	  host	  operating	  system	  in	  which	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  
is	  deployed	  when	  managing	  PERMIS	  standalone	  services,	  and	  via	  SOAP	  messages	  (over	  SSL)	  when	  
managing	  external	  system	  effectors	  and	  probes	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  federated	  identity	  providers).	  
4.2. Service	  Provider	  
A	  single	  service	  provider	  (SP)	  server	  is	  run	  on	  a	  VirtualBox	  virtual	  machine,	  with	  Debian	  6.0.5,	  
512mb	  memory.	  The	  virtual	  machine	  is	  hosted	  on	  a	  Windows	  7	  machine,	  2.40GHz,	  3GB	  memory.	  
The	  service	  provider	  is	  deployed	  as	  a	  set	  of	  web	  resources	  developed	  in	  PHP,	  protected	  by	  a	  single	  
policy	  enforcement	  point	  (PEP).	  The	  SP	  represents	  an	  organization	  and	  the	  organization’s	  resources	  
we	  wish	  to	  protect	  from	  abnormal	  behavior.	  The	  PEP’s	  role	  is	  to	  facilitate	  a	  subject	  accessing	  the	  
SP’s	  resources;	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  guard	  to	  actions	  within	  a	  resource.	  It	  does	  not	  decide	  access,	  only	  
enforces	  access	  based	  on	  decisions	  made	  by	  an	  external	  authorization	  service	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  
PERMIS	  standalone).	  The	  PEP	  is	  built	  in	  PHP,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  simpleSAMLphp	  [21]	  installation,	  in	  order	  to	  
allow	  the	  SP	  to	  communicate	  with	  simpleSAMLphp	  identity	  providers.	  The	  PEP	  receives	  access	  
requests	  from	  subjects	  and	  redirects	  them	  to	  their	  authenticating	  identity	  provider.	  The	  identity	  
provider	  returns	  SAML	  [22]	  assertions	  that	  represent	  the	  requesting	  subject’s	  credential	  assets	  
(described	  in	  Section	  2.1).	  The	  PEP	  encapsulates	  this	  assertion	  into	  a	  PERMIS	  access	  request	  SOAP	  
message,	  and	  enforces	  the	  corresponding	  access	  decision	  that	  is	  returned	  as	  a	  SOAP	  response	  from	  
the	  PERMIS	  standalone.	  Based	  on	  the	  decision	  made	  by	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone,	  the	  PEP	  provides	  
the	  requesting	  subject	  with	  access	  to	  the	  requested	  resource/action.	  
4.3. Identity	  Providers	  
Two	  identity	  provider	  servers	  have	  been	  deployed.	  Each	  is	  run	  on	  a	  separate	  VirtualBox	  virtual	  
machine,	  with	  Debian	  6.0.5,	  512mb	  memory.	  The	  virtual	  machine	  is	  hosted	  on	  a	  Windows	  7	  
machine,	  2.40GHz,	  3GB	  memory.	  The	  identity	  providers	  (IdPs)	  are	  deployed	  as	  an	  authenticating	  
SAML	  service,	  implemented	  using	  SimpleSAMLphp.	  The	  IdP	  authenticates	  a	  subject	  and	  then	  
indicates	  to	  the	  SP	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  who	  they	  say	  they	  are.	  This	  is	  achieved	  by	  sending	  a	  SAML	  
assertion	  containing	  the	  subject’s	  releasable	  attributes	  to	  the	  SP	  (i.e.,	  what	  the	  IdP	  is	  willing	  to	  share	  
based	  on	  it’s	  credential	  issuing	  policy).	  The	  SAML	  assertion	  also	  contains	  a	  unique	  persistent	  ID	  in	  
which	  the	  service	  provider	  can	  identify	  the	  subject	  with.	  A	  Lightweight	  Directory	  Access	  Protocol	  
(LDAP)	  [23]	  with	  a	  Berkley	  database	  backend	  [24]	  is	  used	  to	  store	  an	  identity	  provider’s	  subject	  
attributes,	  hosted	  on	  the	  identity	  provider’s	  own	  server.	  The	  identity	  provider	  is	  configured	  to	  
release	  all	  authorization-­‐based	  attributes,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘permisRole’	  attribute	  that	  is	  used	  by	  PERMIS	  
authorization	  policy	  to	  denote	  a	  subject’s	  role,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  unique	  identifier	  for	  the	  subject.	  Identity	  
providers	  are	  managed	  by	  SAAF	  via	  a	  SimpleSAMLphp	  effector	  [25].	  
5. Experiments	  
This	  section	  describes	  the	  qualitative	  evaluation	  of	  the	  deployed	  self-­‐adaptive	  authorization	  
infrastructure,	  described	  in	  Section	  4.	  We	  simulate	  a	  case	  of	  abnormal	  behavior,	  caused	  by	  a	  group	  
of	  malicious	  subjects	  from	  one	  identity	  provider,	  against	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  service	  provider.	  We	  
discuss	  how	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  identifies	  and	  responds	  to	  this	  case	  of	  abnormal	  behavior,	  
conveying	  our	  results	  with	  snapshots	  of	  before	  and	  after	  states	  of	  an	  active	  authorization	  policy,	  and	  
subject-­‐attribute	  assignments	  stored	  in	  an	  LDAP	  directory.	  We	  follow	  up	  our	  case	  study	  with	  an	  
evaluation	  of	  results,	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  SAAF	  prototype	  to	  usage	  control	  techniques	  built	  into	  an	  
authorization	  service,	  ending	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  current	  limitations	  of	  the	  self-­‐adaptive	  
authorization	  infrastructure.	  
5.1. Case	  Study	  
A	  business	  organization	  shares	  access	  to	  its	  online	  resources	  with	  its	  own	  employees,	  and	  with	  
employees	  belonging	  to	  a	  separate	  contractor	  organization.	  The	  business	  relies	  on	  the	  deployed	  self-­‐
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adaptive	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  described	  in	  Section	  4,	  and	  manages	  its	  own	  identity	  
provider	  (IdP)	  server,	  along	  with	  its	  service	  provider	  (SP)	  server.	  The	  contractor	  organization	  also	  
manages	  its	  own	  IdP	  server,	  along	  with	  their	  employees’	  roles	  and	  attributes.	  The	  business	  shares	  
access	  to	  its	  resources	  with	  the	  contractor	  IdP	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  the	  contractor	  organization	  to	  
perform	  payroll	  operations	  on	  a	  web	  based	  payroll	  system.	  The	  contractor	  has	  an	  automated	  system	  
that	  runs	  the	  payroll	  once	  per	  month,	  and	  there	  are	  occasional	  manual	  payroll	  operations	  during	  the	  
month	  to	  deal	  with	  exceptional	  circumstances.	  The	  SAAF	  controller	  is	  used	  to	  control	  the	  number	  of	  
exceptional	  circumstances	  that	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  normal.	  
The	  business’s	  resources	  are	  protected	  by	  a	  single	  PERMIS	  authorization	  policy	  (AZP),	  which	  is	  
activated	  in	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone	  authorization	  server.	  This	  AZP	  defines	  credential	  validation	  rules	  
and	  RBAC	  rules,	  written	  in	  PERMIS’s	  own	  proprietary	  policy	  schema,	  and	  stored	  as	  a	  digitally	  signed	  
X.509	  policy	  certificate	  on	  the	  authorization	  server’s	  file	  system.	  	  
	  
Figure	  7.	  Excerpt	  from	  the	  business’s	  PERMIS	  Authorization	  Policy	  
The	  AZP1	  in	  Figure	  7	  allows	  members	  of	  the	  attribute	  permisRole=Contractor	  to	  access	  the	  
business	  payroll	  system,	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  manual	  operations	  on	  the	  payroll	  system	  and	  retrieve	  
employee	  pay	  slips	  (Figure	  7,	  TargetAccess).	  The	  AZP	  also	  defines	  a	  role	  assignment	  rule	  (credential	  
validation	  rule)	  whereby	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  is	  trusted	  to	  assign	  the	  permisRole=Contractor	  attribute	  
to	  its	  subjects	  (Figure	  7,	  RoleAssignment).	  	  
We	  simulate	  the	  case	  where	  the	  contractor	  IdP	  has	  been	  hijacked	  by	  a	  malicious	  entity	  (a	  hacker).	  
Once	  in	  control,	  the	  hacker	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  issue	  the	  permisRole=Contractor	  attribute	  to	  a	  set	  of	  
rogue	  subjects	  so	  that	  they	  can	  access	  the	  business’s	  resources	  with	  legitimate	  access	  rights.	  Rogue	  
subjects	  abuse	  this	  access	  right	  to	  mine	  private	  information	  within	  the	  business’s	  resources,	  with	  a	  
focus	  on	  retrieving	  employee	  pay	  slip	  information.	  As	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  is	  trusted	  to	  assign	  the	  
Contractor	  attribute,	  the	  rogue	  subjects	  are	  able	  to	  mine	  information	  from	  the	  permissible	  
resources.	  There	  are	  10	  subjects	  assigned	  to	  the	  Contractor	  attribute,	  any	  number	  of	  which	  may	  be	  
rogue	  subjects.	  These	  subjects	  are	  identified	  by	  their	  persistent	  ID	  (PID),	  which	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  
subject’s	  IdP	  when	  attributes	  are	  released	  in	  SAML	  assertions.	  
5.2. Anomaly	  detection	  and	  adaptation	  
The	  SAAF	  controller	  is	  initialized	  with	  a	  behavior	  policy	  and	  solution	  policy	  containing,	  
respectively,	  the	  triggers	  that	  identify	  abnormal	  behavior	  states,	  and	  the	  solutions	  that	  the	  business	  
trusts	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  to	  execute	  for	  each	  trigger.	  These	  two	  policies	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  service	  
provider,	  and	  relate	  to	  the	  AZP	  deployed	  in	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone.	  
The	  behavior	  policy	  (Figure	  8)	  defines	  the	  conditions	  that	  activate	  the	  need	  for	  adaptation.	  It	  is	  
comprised	  of	  a	  single	  base	  trigger,	  and	  a	  single	  composite	  trigger.	  For	  this	  specific	  case	  study	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Figure	  7	  only	  shows	  the	  subset	  of	  the	  rules	  from	  the	  deployed	  AZP	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  abnormal	  
behavior	  described	  in	  this	  case	  study.	  
<RoleAssignment ID=”ContractorIdPAssignment”> 
 <SubjectDomain ID=”Contractor”/> 
 <RoleList> 
  <Role Type=”permisRole” Value=”Contractor”/> 
 </RoleList> 
 <Delegate Depth=”0”/> 





  <Role type=”permisRole” Value=”Contractor”/> 
 </RoleList> 
 <TargetList> 
  <TargetDomain ID=”PayrollSystem”/> 
  <AllowedAction ID=”getEmpPayslip”/> 
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have	  defined	  the	  limits	  of	  normal	  behavior	  as	  base	  trigger	  bt1,	  and	  composite	  trigger	  ct1.	  The	  base	  
trigger	  (bt1)	  specifies	  a	  state	  of	  abnormal	  behavior	  when	  any	  subject,	  from	  any	  provider,	  uses	  the	  
attribute	  permisRole=Contractor	  to	  access	  the	  get	  employee	  pay	  slip	  action	  on	  the	  payroll	  system,	  
greater	  than	  5	  times	  per	  minute.	  Should	  these	  conditions	  be	  met,	  adaptation	  may	  be	  required.	  The	  
composite2	  trigger	  specifies	  that	  should	  conditions	  meet	  the	  base	  trigger	  ‘bt1’	  more	  than	  4	  times	  
within	  a	  1-­‐day	  interval,	  further	  adaptation	  may	  be	  required.	  	  
	  
Figure	  8.	  SAAF	  Behavior	  Policy	  
The	  SAAF	  controller	  generates	  behavior	  statistics	  from	  each	  successful	  access	  request	  that	  
matches	  the	  relationship	  and	  conditions	  described	  in	  each	  trigger.	  At	  first	  no	  adaptation	  is	  triggered,	  
as	  the	  rogue	  subject’s	  initial	  set	  of	  access	  requests	  will	  not	  fire	  any	  triggers	  within	  the	  behavior	  
policy.	  However,	  access	  requests	  are	  continually	  monitored	  by	  the	  monitor	  components	  within	  the	  
SAAF	  controller,	  building	  up	  a	  view	  of	  the	  rogue	  subject’s	  usage	  and	  their	  attribute	  assignments.	  	  
The	  first	  abnormal	  behavior	  that	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  responds	  to	  is	  when	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  
base	  trigger	  ‘bt1’	  are	  met,	  identifying	  that	  one	  subject	  has	  accessed	  the	  get	  employee	  pay	  slip	  action	  
more	  than	  5	  times	  per	  minute.	  The	  SAAF	  controller	  must	  now	  analyze	  the	  identified	  misbehavior,	  
before	  solution	  selection	  begins,	  by	  identifying	  which	  subject	  from	  which	  IdP	  has	  performed	  the	  5	  
access	  requests	  within	  a	  minute	  interval.	  	  	  
The	  solutions	  policy	  (Figure	  9)	  specifies	  four	  solutions	  to	  solve	  any	  abnormal	  behavior	  identified	  
by	  conditions	  in	  the	  behavior	  policy.	  Solution	  one	  (S1)	  allows	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  subject’s	  attribute	  
from	  his/her	  identity	  provider,	  impacting	  only	  a	  single	  individual.	  Solution	  two	  (S2)	  impacts	  everyone	  
with	  the	  permisRole=Contractor	  attribute,	  regardless	  of	  the	  IdP,	  by	  removing	  the	  ABAC/RBAC	  
permission	  that	  allows	  the	  Contractor	  attribute	  to	  execute	  the	  get	  pay	  slip	  payroll	  permission.	  
Solution	  three	  (S3)	  impacts	  all	  subjects	  from	  an	  IdP,	  by	  removing	  the	  credential	  validation	  rule	  
stating	  the	  IdP	  can	  assign	  the	  attribute	  contractor.	  Finally,	  Solution	  four	  (S4)	  impacts	  every	  subject	  
that	  is	  managed	  by	  the	  AZP	  by	  removing	  the	  ABAC/RBAC	  policy	  that	  exists	  within	  the	  deployed	  AZP.	  
There	  is	  also	  a	  default	  solution	  of	  ‘do	  nothing’,	  which	  applies	  to	  all	  instances	  of	  abnormal	  behavior.	  
The	  default	  solution	  is	  important	  as	  the	  realization	  of	  all	  defined	  solutions	  may	  cause	  a	  greater	  
negative	  impact	  on	  the	  federation,	  than	  opposed	  to	  allowing	  a	  case	  of	  malicious	  behavior	  to	  
continue.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  composite	  trigger	  (ct1)	  builds	  upon	  base	  triggers.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  the	  composite	  trigger	  only	  builds	  
upon	  one	  base	  trigger,	  however	  for	  producing	  more	  complex	  conditions,	  several	  base	  triggers	  can	  be	  used.	  
<BehaviourPolicy> 
 <BaseTrigger ID=”bt1”> 
  <Subject/> 
  <Provider/> 
  <Attribute type=”permisRole”>Contractor<Attribute> 
  <Target>PayrollSystem</Target> 
  <Action>getEmpPayslip</Action> 
  <Rate> 
   <Threshold>5</Threshold> 
   <Interval>1</Interval> 
   <TimeScale>min</TimeScale> 
  </Rate> 
 </BaseTrigger> 
 <CompositeTrigger ID=”ct1”> 
  <BaseTriggerID>bt1<BaseTriggerID> 
  <Rate> 
   <Threshold>4</Threshold> 
   <Interval>1</Interval> 
   <TimeScale>day</TimeScale> 
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Figure	  9.	  SAAF	  Solutions	  Policy	  
The	  SAAF	  controller	  executes	  solution	  analysis	  for	  the	  identified	  abnormal	  behavior	  by	  evaluating	  
each	  applicable	  solution	  and	  tailoring	  it	  to	  the	  relationship	  identified	  by	  the	  trigger	  ‘bt1’.	  Solution	  
analysis	  tailors	  the	  first	  solution	  (S1	  –	  removeSubjectAttribute)	  by	  identifying	  the	  unique	  persistent	  
ID	  (PID)	  associated	  with	  the	  subject	  (provided	  by	  the	  subject’s	  identity	  provider),	  along	  with	  the	  valid	  
attributes	  used	  to	  gain	  access.	  This	  results	  in	  a	  SOAP	  message	  (Figure	  10)	  being	  generated,	  
requesting	  the	  contractor	  IdP	  effector	  to	  remove	  the	  contractor	  attribute	  from	  the	  rogue	  subject,	  
identified	  by	  the	  subject’s	  PID	  (bb85c0aa1b55ade46a047bd60375ed9c872a6b58).	  The	  contractor	  
IdP	  effector	  is	  capable	  of	  identifying	  the	  subject’s	  location	  in	  their	  attribute	  repository	  by	  the	  PID	  
supplied	  in	  the	  SOAP	  message	  (in	  this	  case,	  mapping	  the	  PID	  to	  an	  LDAP	  distinguished	  name).	  
	  
Figure	  10.	  Contractor	  IdP	  effector	  request,	  remove	  subject-­‐attribute	  assignment	  
<SolutionPolicy> 
 <Solution> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>removeSubjectAttribute</Operation> 
  </Action> 




  <Action> 
   <Operation>removeAttributePermission</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>buildPolicy</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>activatePolicy</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <TriggerID>ct1</TriggerID> 
 </Solution> 
 <Solution> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>removeAttributeAssignment</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>buildPolicyFile</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>activatePolicy</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <TriggerID>ct1</TriggerID> 
 </Solution> 
 <Solution> 
  <Action> 
   <Operation>deactivatePolicy</Operation> 
  </Action> 
  <TriggerID>ct1</TriggerID> 
 </Solution> 
</SolutionPolicy> 
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"  




  <requestAdaptation soapenv:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"> 
     <operation xsi:type="xsd:string">removeAttribute</operation> 
     <subjectID xsi:type="xsd:string"> 
bb85c0aa1b55ade46a047bd60375ed9c872a6b58 
     </subjectID> 
     <serviceProviderID xsi:type="xsd:string">https://SP.localhost</serviceProviderID> 
     <attributeType xsi:type="xsd:string">permisRole</attributeType> 
     <attributeValue xsi:type="xsd:string"></attributeValue> 
     <reason xsi:type="xsd:string">Malicious behaviour</reason> 
  </requestAdaptation> 
</soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
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However,	  as	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  has	  been	  hijacked,	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  progresses	  to	  a	  state	  
where	  multiple	  rogue	  subjects	  are	  now	  identified	  as	  conforming	  to	  the	  base	  trigger	  ‘bt1’.	  Each	  time	  
SAAF	  undergoes	  solution	  analysis	  and	  solution	  selection,	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  removes	  each	  
offending	  subject’s	  permisRole=Contractor	  attribute	  assignment.	  	  
After	  four	  such	  events	  (within	  a	  single	  day	  interval),	  the	  trigger	  conditions	  for	  composite	  trigger	  
‘ct1’	  are	  met.	  Now	  more	  definitive	  solutions	  are	  analyzed	  (S1,	  S2,	  S3,	  S4)	  in	  order	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  
persistent	  case	  of	  abnormal	  behavior.	  Solution	  selection	  eventually	  results	  in	  solution	  three	  (S3)	  
being	  selected,	  whereby	  the	  solution	  enforces	  the	  removal	  of	  a	  credential	  validation	  rule	  that	  trusts	  
the	  Contractor	  IdP	  to	  assign	  the	  Contractor	  attribute	  to	  its	  subjects.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  greater	  weight	  of	  
subjects	  causing	  misbehavior	  from	  the	  Contractor	  IdP,	  over	  subjects	  who	  are	  not	  causing	  
misbehavior	  from	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  or	  the	  Business	  IdP.	  The	  selected	  solution	  results	  in	  a	  set	  of	  
actions	  being	  generated,	  whereby	  the	  credential	  validation	  rule	  (RoleAssignment,	  Figure	  7)	  of	  
{Contractor	  IdP,	  permisRole=Contractor}	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  authorization	  model,	  and	  a	  new	  
authorization	  policy	  is	  generated	  that	  can	  be	  used	  within	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone.	  The	  impact	  of	  this	  
solution	  means	  that	  all	  subjects	  from	  the	  Contractor	  IdP,	  with	  the	  Contractor	  attribute,	  will	  no	  
longer	  be	  able	  to	  execute	  permissions	  associated	  with	  the	  Contractor	  attribute.	  
5.3. Results	  
The	  case	  study	  resulted	  in	  two	  types	  of	  solutions	  executed	  within	  the	  self-­‐adaptive	  authorization	  
infrastructure.	  The	  first	  (S1)	  refers	  to	  individual	  requests	  of	  subject-­‐attribute	  removal,	  whereby	  
several	  SOAP	  requests	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  effector	  to	  remove	  the	  
permisRole=Contractor	  attribute	  from	  abusive	  subjects.	  As	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  effector	  is	  configured	  
to	  trust	  the	  request	  from	  the	  SAAF	  controller,	  these	  attributes	  are	  removed.	  Figure	  11	  provides	  a	  
snapshot	  taken	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  one	  execution	  of	  one	  of	  the	  adaptation	  requests	  to	  the	  contractor	  
IdP’s	  effector.	  The	  LDAP	  entry	  for	  Bob	  Doe	  (PID:	  bb85c0aa1b55ade46a047bd60375ed9c872a6b58	  in	  
SAAF)	  has	  an	  objectClass	  of	  pmiUser3,	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  hold	  a	  permisRole	  attribute.	  Prior	  to	  
adaptation	  this	  attribute	  contains	  the	  Contractor	  value,	  post	  adaptation	  the	  Contractor	  value	  has	  
been	  removed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  request	  described	  in	  Figure	  10.	  Effectively	  this	  prevents	  the	  subject	  
Bob	  Doe	  from	  using	  the	  permisRole=Contractor	  attribute	  within	  future	  access	  requests,	  as	  the	  SAML	  




Figure	  11.	  Snapshots	  of	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  LDAP	  directory,	  captured	  in	  Jxplorer	  LDAP	  viewer	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  ‘permisRole’	  attribute	  is	  added	  manually	  to	  the	  LDAP	  schema	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  the	  PERMIS	  
standalone	  authorization	  server	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  attribute	  to	  use	  for	  authorization.	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Subject-­‐attribute	  adaptations	  provide	  a	  fine-­‐grained	  solution	  to	  solving	  abnormal	  behavior	  over	  
policy	  adaptations.	  These	  adaptations	  rely	  on	  the	  IdP	  abiding	  by	  the	  SAAF	  controller’s	  request.	  
However,	  IdPs	  are	  capable	  of	  reissuing	  a	  subject’s	  attributes	  allowing	  the	  conditions	  for	  abnormal	  
behavior	  to	  either	  remain	  or	  be	  reinstated.	  The	  abuse	  may	  escalate	  when	  the	  IdP	  reissues	  the	  
removed	  attributes.	  This	  results	  in	  the	  2nd	  type	  of	  solution	  (s3)	  being	  realized,	  a	  modification	  to	  the	  
service	  provider’s	  authorization	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  credential	  validation.	  Figure	  12	  displays	  a	  
snapshot	  of	  the	  PERMIS	  authorization	  policy	  deployed	  in	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone,	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐
adaptation.	  The	  RoleAssignment	  rule	  in	  the	  policy	  defines	  the	  trust	  relationship	  between	  the	  service	  
provider	  and	  the	  Contractor	  IdP.	  Previous	  to	  adaptation,	  the	  service	  provider	  trusts	  the	  Contractor	  
IdP	  to	  issue	  the	  permisRole=Contractor	  attribute	  to	  any	  subject	  in	  the	  Contractor’s	  domain	  for	  any	  
validity	  period.	  Post	  adaptation	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  is	  trusted	  to	  issue	  no	  attributes	  (defined	  by	  an	  
empty	  role	  list).	  This	  prevents	  any	  subject	  from	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  being	  authorized	  by	  the	  PERMIS	  
standalone,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  subject’s	  SAML	  assertion	  contains	  the	  permisRole=Contractor	  
attribute	  or	  not,	  as	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  valid.	  This	  solution	  provides	  a	  coarser	  grained	  and	  less	  volatile	  
solution	  to	  solving	  abnormal	  behavior,	  over	  subject-­‐attribute	  adaptations,	  as	  the	  service	  provider’s	  
authorization	  policy	  overrules	  external	  factors	  (such	  as	  IdP	  issued	  attributes).	  However,	  there	  is	  
greater	  risk,	  as	  all	  subjects	  within	  the	  Contractor	  IdP	  will	  be	  affected,	  not	  just	  the	  subjects	  that	  have	  
misused	  their	  access.	  
	  
Figure	  12.	  Snapshots	  of	  the	  Service	  Provider’s	  PERMIS	  Authorization	  Policy	  
The	  case	  study	  was	  executed	  in	  six	  stages,	  whereby	  in	  each	  stage	  an	  additional	  malicious	  subject	  
was	  introduced	  to	  execute	  a	  high	  throughput	  of	  authorization	  requests	  (which	  would	  ultimately	  
break	  behavior	  rules).	  Through	  our	  simulation	  we	  captured	  the	  escalation	  in	  planning,	  solution	  
selection	  and	  execution	  of	  adaptations	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  each	  stage	  a	  successful	  
adaptation	  had	  occurred,	  preventing	  one	  or	  more	  subjects	  from	  continuing	  the	  identified	  abuse.	  
Each	  stage	  lasted	  90	  seconds	  with	  remaining	  non-­‐malicious	  subjects	  executing	  authorization	  
requests	  throughout	  the	  90-­‐second	  period,	  in	  conformance	  to	  usage	  limits	  defined	  in	  behavior	  rules	  
(with	  a	  constant	  throughput	  of	  3	  requests	  per	  minute).	  Once	  normal	  subject	  throughput	  had	  
stabilized,	  the	  malicious	  subject	  was	  introduced.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  solutions	  executed,	  we	  captured	  performance	  measures	  that	  denote	  the	  response	  
time	  of	  the	  SAAF	  controller,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  identifying	  a	  case	  of	  abnormal	  behavior	  to	  the	  point	  
that	  the	  behavior	  can	  no	  longer	  continue	  (for	  the	  subject	  concerned).	  This	  includes	  the	  time	  taken	  
for	  system	  effectors	  to	  carry	  out	  an	  adaptation	  successfully	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  with	  
confirmation.	  To	  gain	  a	  performance	  average,	  the	  case	  study	  was	  repeated	  10	  times,	  under	  the	  same	  
conditions	  with	  the	  same	  instance	  of	  the	  executing	  SAAF	  controller.	  
For	  the	  identification	  of	  malicious	  activity	  in	  stages	  1	  to	  3	  relating	  to	  trigger	  bt1,	  and	  resulting	  in	  
the	  execution	  of	  solution	  1	  (S1),	  the	  average	  response	  time	  ranged	  from	  113.5ms	  to	  162.4ms.	  
However,	  by	  the	  forth	  stage	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  has	  now	  identified	  four	  rule	  breakages	  in	  relation	  to	  
trigger	  bt1.	  As	  a	  result,	  trigger	  ct1	  is	  invoked,	  requiring	  the	  SAAF	  controller	  to	  consider	  additional	  
solutions;	  this	  causes	  the	  response	  time	  to	  increase	  to	  an	  average	  of	  297.67ms.	  In	  the	  fifth	  stage,	  
despite	  continued	  non-­‐conformance	  in	  relation	  to	  trigger	  ct1,	  solution	  1	  is	  repeatedly	  executed,	  as	  
solutions	  2	  to	  4	  are	  deemed	  too	  consequential	  in	  SAAF’s	  solution	  selection	  phase.	  Finally	  in	  the	  sixth	  
stage	  solution	  3	  is	  selected,	  resulting	  in	  the	  contractor	  credential	  validation	  rule	  being	  removed	  from	  
the	  authorization	  policy.	  The	  average	  response	  time	  of	  solution	  3	  is	  significantly	  higher	  in	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comparison	  to	  the	  execution	  of	  solution	  1;	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  required	  restart	  of	  the	  PERMIS	  
standalone,	  in	  order	  to	  activate	  a	  newly	  created	  authorization	  policy.	  
	  











1	   bt1	   0f23c42b…	   S1	   S1	   113.5	   26.77	  
2	   bt1	   36c29160…	   S1	   S1	   162.4	   52.91	  
3	   bt1	   01afed25…	   S1	   S1	   151.3	   52	  
4	   bt1+ct1	   bb85c0aa…	   S1,	  S2,	  S3,	  S4	   S1	   297.67	   33.8	  
5	   bt1+ct1	   566f86da…	   S1,	  S2,	  S3,	  S4	   S1	   248.67	   71.77	  
6	   bt1+ct1	   c81c6d12…	   S1,	  S2,	  S3,	  S4	   S3	   824.78	   75.31	  
Table	  1.	  Escalation	  of	  case	  study	  adaptations,	  and	  performance	  results	  
5.4. Comparison	  to	  Current	  Technology	  
Current	  technology	  is	  confined	  to	  authorization	  infrastructures	  that	  build	  upon	  authorization	  
models	  yet	  include	  further	  controls	  to	  implement	  concepts	  to	  assert	  whether	  or	  not	  subjects	  should	  
be	  awarded	  access.	  One	  such	  example	  is	  the	  use	  of	  obligations	  and	  conditions	  within	  RBAC	  /	  ABAC	  
policies	  to	  compliment	  authorization	  constraints	  (i.e.,	  subject	  ‘s’	  with	  role	  ‘x’	  can	  execution	  
permission	  ‘y’).	  Obligations	  and	  conditions	  allow	  for	  specific	  rules	  that	  can	  help	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  
insider	  threat.	  For	  example,	  a	  subject	  must	  conform	  to	  obligations	  where	  the	  subject	  is	  required	  to	  
read	  a	  ‘license	  agreement’	  before	  continuing,	  or	  meet	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  are	  not	  accessing	  a	  
resource	  past	  a	  particular	  time	  of	  day.	  In	  particular,	  conditions	  combined	  with	  conventional	  
authorization	  constraints	  can	  establish	  usage	  control	  rules,	  similar	  to	  the	  base	  triggers	  defined	  
within	  the	  SAAF	  controller.	  
The	  PERMIS	  policy	  schema	  allows	  such	  obligations	  and	  conditions	  within	  a	  PERMIS	  authorization	  
policy.	  We	  have	  used	  a	  condition	  to	  replicate	  the	  base	  trigger	  ‘bt1’	  described	  in	  the	  case	  study	  for	  
comparison.	  Figure	  13	  identifies	  the	  replicated	  base	  trigger,	  which	  simply	  states	  an	  environment	  
variable	  labeled	  ‘ratePerMin’	  must	  be	  less	  than	  a	  value	  of	  6.	  The	  subject’s	  actual	  rate	  per	  minute	  is	  
maintained	  and	  calculated	  by	  the	  resource	  policy	  enforcement	  point	  (PEP)	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  
requesting	  access	  through.	  Upon	  each	  access	  request	  the	  subject	  makes,	  their	  ratePerMin	  
environment	  parameter	  is	  sent	  alongside	  the	  subject’s	  valid	  attributes	  and	  requested	  
resource/action	  in	  the	  access	  request	  to	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone.	  The	  PERMIS	  standalone	  decides	  
upon	  access	  whilst	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  condition	  rule	  defined	  in	  the	  given	  policy	  permission.	  
	  
Figure	  13.	  Trigger	  ‘bt1’	  represented	  in	  the	  PERMIS	  Authorization	  Policy	  
Usage	  control	  configured	  into	  the	  PERMIS	  authorization	  policy	  is	  limited	  to	  only	  managing	  
individual	  subject	  usage	  at	  a	  per	  resource	  level,	  therefore	  it	  is	  only	  possible	  to	  compare	  the	  SAAF	  
prototype	  based	  on	  base	  triggers	  and	  individual	  adaptations	  taken	  against	  a	  subject’s	  IdP.	  Composite	  
<TargetAccess ID=”ContractPayrol”> 
 <RoleList> 
     <Role type=”permisRole” Value=”Contractor”/> 
 </RoleList> 
 <TargetList> 
     <TargetDomain ID=”PayrollSystem”/> 
     <AllowedAction ID=”getEmpPayslip”/> 
     <AllowedAction ID=”runPayroll”/> 
 </TargetList> 
 <IF> 
     <AND> 
  <OR> 
      <LT> 
   <Environment Parameter=”ratePerMin” Type=Integer”/> 
<Constant Type=”Integer” Value=”6”/> 
      </LT> 
  </OR> 
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triggers	  consider	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  data	  from	  multiple	  resources	  and	  subjects,	  and	  are	  therefore	  out	  
of	  scope	  of	  this	  comparison.	  	  
To	  compare,	  we	  repeated	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  case	  study	  experiment	  with	  usage	  control	  
configured	  into	  the	  PERMIS	  standalone.	  We	  maintained	  the	  same	  conditions	  as	  the	  experiment	  
performed	  with	  SAAF,	  whereby	  10	  normal	  subjects	  executed	  a	  throughput	  of	  3	  requests	  per	  minute	  
in	  a	  period	  of	  90	  seconds.	  Once	  throughput	  had	  stabilized	  we	  introduced	  a	  single	  malicious	  subject	  
with	  a	  high	  throughput	  of	  100	  requests	  per	  minute.	  This	  was	  repeated	  10	  times	  to	  gain	  an	  average	  of	  
performance	  for	  measuring	  PERMIS’s	  response	  time	  in	  denying	  the	  subject	  access	  (after	  the	  
subject’s	  usage	  limit	  was	  met).	  We	  found	  that	  PERMIS	  was	  able	  to	  deny	  access	  in	  response	  to	  a	  
usage	  control	  violation	  with	  an	  average	  of	  10.8ms,	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  5.58.	  However,	  the	  
‘deny’	  in	  authorization	  could	  only	  temporarily	  prevent	  the	  subject	  from	  gaining	  access.	  Once	  the	  
subject’s	  rate	  of	  requests	  dropped	  below	  5	  requests	  per	  minute,	  the	  subject	  began	  receiving	  grants	  
of	  access	  again.	  
In	  comparison	  to	  the	  SAAF	  prototype,	  usage	  control	  in	  PERMIS	  is	  predominately	  faster	  in	  
responding	  to	  usage	  violations,	  yet	  only	  temporarily	  prevents	  the	  malicious	  subject	  from	  continuing.	  
It	  is	  plausible	  to	  argue	  that	  lengthy	  usage	  control	  limits	  (such	  as	  limits	  defined	  in	  weeks,	  months,	  
years)	  will	  temporarily	  prevent	  the	  malicious	  subject	  from	  continuing	  for	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  time,	  
making	  it	  possible	  for	  human	  controllers	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  timely	  manner.	  However,	  this	  approach	  
relies	  on	  the	  human	  controller	  to	  respond	  and	  would	  be	  inefficient	  in	  preventing	  malicious	  activity	  
carried	  out	  over	  a	  short	  interval	  of	  time.	  
5.5. Discussion	  and	  Limitations	  
We	  have	  demonstrated	  the	  feasibility	  of	  managing	  authorization,	  by	  autonomic	  adaptation	  of	  
authorization	  policies	  and	  subject-­‐attribute	  assignments,	  in	  a	  federated	  authorization	  infrastructure	  
based	  on	  behavioral	  analysis.	  Model	  transformations	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  way	  in	  
adapting	  authorization	  policies,	  considering	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  policies	  were	  never	  intended	  to	  be	  
adapted	  autonomously.	  Regarding	  subject-­‐attribute	  assignments,	  which	  are	  traditionally	  managed	  
by	  administrators,	  we	  have	  also	  shown	  that	  these	  can	  also	  be	  adapted	  autonomously.	  However,	  the	  
solution	  selection	  in	  the	  current	  implementation,	  despite	  solving	  the	  abnormal	  behavior	  detected,	  
does	  not	  represent	  a	  best	  choice	  solution	  for	  the	  given	  scenarios.	  
We	  have	  compared	  the	  SAAF	  prototype	  to	  the	  limits	  of	  current	  technology	  in	  authorization	  
services	  (PERMIS	  standalone).	  As	  a	  result	  we	  identify	  that	  although	  techniques	  such	  as	  usage	  control	  
can	  impact	  and	  potentially	  slow	  down	  malicious	  activity,	  it	  cannot	  prevent	  identified	  malicious	  
activity	  from	  continuing	  permanently.	  The	  SAAF	  prototype	  (in	  comparison)	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  
impose	  additional	  risks	  within	  the	  federation.	  This	  is	  especially	  the	  case	  if	  considering	  the	  subject	  
privileges	  removed	  belonged	  to	  a	  critical	  subject,	  as	  opposed	  to	  simply	  temporarily	  denying	  access.	  
However,	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  a	  malicious	  subject	  through	  persistent	  abuse	  (for	  instance	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  credential	  stealing)	  could	  equally	  present	  as	  much	  risk	  in	  not	  taking	  permanent	  actions,	  as	  
the	  SAAF	  prototype	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  achieve.	  In	  addition,	  if	  usage	  control	  techniques	  were	  to	  be	  
deployed	  across	  multiple	  resources	  it	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  for	  an	  authorization	  service,	  such	  as	  the	  
PERMIS	  standalone	  (or	  similar	  services),	  to	  assess	  total	  usage	  across	  all	  subject	  sessions,	  whereas	  a	  
SAAF	  controller	  is	  capable	  of	  monitoring	  and	  assessing	  combined	  sessions	  of	  usage	  at	  multiple	  
resources.	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  risks,	  we	  identify	  that	  the	  current	  implementation	  of	  the	  SAAF	  prototype	  has	  a	  
number	  of	  limitations	  that	  we	  propose	  to	  address	  as	  the	  research	  continues.	  First	  and	  foremost	  we	  
have	  no	  metrics	  for	  describing	  the	  scale	  of	  misbehavior.	  Not	  all	  misbehaviors	  are	  equally	  disastrous.	  
Some	  may	  only	  cause	  a	  minor	  irritation	  or	  inconvenience	  to	  the	  organization,	  whilst	  some	  may	  be	  
serious	  enough	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  on-­‐going	  viability	  of	  the	  business.	  Consequently	  we	  need	  to	  
introduce	  a	  scale	  component	  into	  the	  behavior	  policy,	  which	  we	  have	  termed	  impact.	  Related	  to	  
this,	  we	  also	  have	  no	  equivalent	  metric	  for	  describing	  the	  scale	  of	  a	  solution.	  Removing	  the	  
permissions	  from	  all	  role/attribute	  holders	  is	  clearly	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  greater	  in	  impact	  than	  
either	  of	  the	  previous	  modifications,	  and	  is	  dependent	  upon	  the	  number	  of	  role/attribute	  holders.	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The	  next	  limitation	  is	  that	  solutions	  are	  currently	  pre-­‐defined	  for	  each	  of	  the	  misbehaviors	  (in	  the	  
solutions	  policy),	  and	  these	  solutions	  are	  chosen	  based	  on	  a	  calculation	  of	  the	  subjects	  that	  are	  
impacted,	  as	  described	  in	  Section	  3.4.1.	  The	  dimensions	  used	  represent	  an	  artificial	  utility	  for	  a	  
solution,	  which	  alone	  is	  not	  enough	  when	  considering	  which	  solutions	  to	  realize.	  Multiple	  
dimensions	  that	  compute	  the	  utility	  or	  impact	  must	  be	  considered,	  such	  as,	  impact	  to	  organizations	  
and	  their	  subject	  base	  (e.g.,	  through	  loss	  of	  functionality,	  ability	  to	  service	  customers,	  process	  orders	  
and	  invoices	  etc.),	  and	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  behavior	  is	  indeed	  abnormal.	  Once	  solutions	  have	  
appropriate	  impact	  dimensions	  associated	  with	  them,	  SAAF	  will	  have	  a	  scale	  by	  which	  to	  compare	  
one	  solution	  with	  another,	  and	  with	  a	  given	  misbehavior,	  so	  that	  the	  direct	  linking	  of	  solutions	  to	  
misbehaviors	  via	  their	  policies	  can	  be	  removed.	  
6. Related	  Work	  
There	  are	  few	  works	  that	  attempt	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  misuse	  of	  access	  rights	  during	  run-­‐time	  
and	  using	  self-­‐adaptive	  techniques,	  although	  there	  are	  some	  approaches	  that	  attempt	  to	  rule	  out	  
misuse	  completely	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  insider	  threat.	  	  
Usage	  control	  (UCON)	  [5]	  extends	  traditional	  access	  control	  methods	  through	  further	  definition	  
of	  rules	  to	  primarily	  manage	  a	  subject’s	  access	  by	  assessing	  subject	  usage.	  It	  uses	  mutable	  attributes	  
(captured	  by	  conditions	  and	  obligations)	  about	  the	  subject’s	  access	  usage	  as	  part	  of	  the	  access	  
control	  decision	  process.	  The	  pretext	  to	  this	  could	  arguably	  be	  that	  incorporating	  these	  mutable	  
attributes	  as	  part	  of	  the	  decision	  process	  can	  prevent	  abnormal	  behavior.	  Whilst	  the	  UCON	  model	  is	  
sophisticated	  in	  identifying	  and	  managing	  a	  subject’s	  usage,	  it	  only	  allows	  for	  short-­‐term	  solutions	  in	  
managing	  abnormal	  behavior.	  Once	  a	  subject’s	  level	  of	  usage	  has	  ‘cooled	  down’	  the	  subject	  can	  
continue.	  In	  comparison	  to	  the	  SAAF	  prototype	  if	  a	  subject	  repeatedly	  meets	  their	  usage	  limits,	  we	  
assume	  the	  subject	  to	  be	  potentially	  malicious,	  which	  requires	  persistent	  solutions	  like	  those	  that	  
are	  implemented	  in	  SAAF.	  An	  advantage	  UCON	  does	  provide	  over	  the	  SAAF	  prototype	  is	  the	  ability	  
to	  impact	  a	  subject’s	  access	  during	  their	  session	  of	  access,	  whereby	  if	  UCON	  rules	  are	  broken	  access	  
is	  disrupted	  immediately	  during	  the	  subject’s	  session.	  SAAF	  is	  confined	  by	  its	  ability	  to	  only	  react	  
post	  subject	  access	  requests.	  
Trust	  PDPs	  [26]	  and	  trust	  policies	  [27]	  also	  can	  improve	  upon	  traditional	  authorization.	  The	  use	  of	  
trust	  policies	  is	  a	  method	  in	  which	  either	  a	  group	  of	  users	  or	  an	  individual’s	  trust	  is	  calculated,	  for	  
example,	  based	  on	  the	  attributes	  they	  own.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  of	  a	  user	  is	  associated	  
with	  the	  cost	  of	  carrying	  out	  an	  action,	  e.g.,	  associating	  cost	  to	  a	  credential.	  The	  combined	  cost	  of	  
those	  credentials	  will	  establish	  how	  trustworthy	  that	  user	  is.	  This	  particular	  method,	  although	  may	  
improve	  upon	  more	  deserved	  access	  decisions,	  does	  not	  cover	  the	  potential	  that	  a	  trusted	  user	  
could	  turn	  rogue,	  whereby	  using	  their	  gained	  trust	  to	  abuse	  their	  access.	  Trust	  could	  also	  be	  viewed	  
from	  a	  different	  perspective	  whereby	  reputation	  (behavior)	  is	  involved	  [4].	  For	  instance,	  a	  user’s	  
level	  of	  trust	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  how	  they	  use	  the	  different	  services	  and	  whether	  they	  use	  
services	  correctly.	  This	  method	  is	  better	  suited	  to	  preventing	  a	  subject’s	  ability	  to	  abuse	  access	  
rights,	  as	  abuse	  over	  time	  would	  result	  in	  the	  subject	  becoming	  untrustworthy.	  However	  a	  trust	  
approach	  is	  limited,	  as	  no	  concrete	  actions	  are	  taken	  to	  prevent	  the	  subject	  from	  continuing	  abuse	  
completely,	  meaning	  services	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  required	  trust	  can	  still	  be	  abused.	  Logical	  
attestation	  [28]	  builds	  on	  authorization,	  yet	  purposed	  towards	  the	  reasoning	  of	  behavior	  exhibited	  
by	  applications,	  rather	  than	  human	  subjects.	  It	  allows	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  trust	  of	  applications	  
within	  an	  operating	  system	  as	  part	  of	  the	  authorization	  process,	  which	  is	  successful	  in	  preventing	  
untrustworthy	  behavior.	  However,	  applications	  and	  systems	  are	  far	  more	  predictable	  than	  human	  
users,	  meaning	  the	  classification	  of	  behavior	  is	  a	  more	  concrete	  process	  and	  irrelevant	  in	  application	  
to	  SAAF’s	  own	  analysis	  requirements.	  
Some	  systems	  attempt	  to	  actively	  resolve	  abnormal	  behavior,	  yet	  not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  federated	  
authorization	  infrastructures.	  Examples	  include	  active	  intrusion	  detection	  systems,	  such	  as	  
WebStalker	  [29],	  and	  credit	  card	  profiling	  systems	  [30];	  however	  both	  are	  highly	  tuned	  to	  their	  
target	  domain.	  Active	  IDSs	  work	  at	  the	  network	  level	  and	  adapt	  firewall	  rules	  to	  prevent	  certain	  
types	  of	  network	  traffic.	  Credit	  card	  profiling	  is	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  fraud,	  and	  is	  limited	  to	  nature	  of	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credit	  card	  actions,	  in	  comparison	  to	  multiple	  target	  resources	  and	  actions	  with	  associated	  different	  
risks	  and	  impacts.	  Other	  works	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  abnormal	  behavior	  through	  the	  dynamic	  
configuration	  of	  security	  policies	  [31],	  where	  adaptations	  are	  defined	  within	  security	  policies,	  in	  
which	  security	  constraints	  have	  alternative	  branches	  based	  on	  conditions.	  However,	  similar	  to	  logical	  
attestation,	  the	  work	  is	  purposed	  predominately	  for	  the	  control	  of	  access	  by	  mobile	  programs	  
(applications).	  	  
As	  our	  work	  builds	  upon	  self-­‐adaptive	  systems,	  it	  takes	  inspiration	  from	  systems	  that	  have	  
already	  achieved	  autonomic	  management,	  yet	  in	  different	  contexts.	  The	  Rainbow	  Framework	  [32]	  
manages	  architectural	  self-­‐adaptation,	  and	  demonstrates	  the	  management	  of	  a	  web	  based	  client-­‐
server	  system	  to	  ensure	  optimal	  availability	  of	  web	  assets	  (e.g.,	  by	  increasing	  the	  amount	  of	  
available	  servers).	  SAAF	  follows	  a	  similar	  process	  to	  Rainbow,	  yet	  rather	  than	  adapting	  the	  system	  
architecture	  it	  adapts	  the	  controlling	  assets	  of	  a	  system.	  Rainbow	  also	  utilizes	  a	  self-­‐adaptive	  
language	  called	  Stitch	  [33].	  Stitch	  has	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  our	  event-­‐response	  model	  used	  within	  
the	  SAAF	  controller,	  referred	  to	  as	  triggers	  and	  solutions.	  
7. Conclusion	  
There	  is	  an	  inherent	  need	  for	  autonomic	  management	  of	  authorization	  infrastructures	  given	  the	  
spread	  of	  protected	  resources	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  authorized	  users	  over	  multiple	  domains.	  In	  this	  
paper,	  we	  have	  presented	  a	  Self-­‐Adaptive	  Authorization	  Framework	  (SAAF),	  in	  which	  the	  SAAF	  
controller	  is	  a	  key	  component,	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  autonomic	  management	  of	  federated	  authorization	  
infrastructures.	  The	  approach	  used	  is	  focused	  on	  managing	  federated	  role/attribute	  based	  
authorization	  models	  (RBAC/ABAC),	  and	  the	  MAPE-­‐K	  autonomic	  computing	  reference	  model.	  We	  
have	  described	  SAAF’s	  conceptual	  design	  as	  well	  as	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  prototype,	  focusing	  on	  
how	  SAAF	  generates	  adaptations	  based	  on	  configuration	  and	  behavioral	  models	  of	  the	  authorization	  
infrastructure.	  One	  advantage	  of	  SAAF,	  compared	  with	  more	  traditional	  approaches,	  is	  its	  
responsiveness	  when	  reacting	  to	  circumstances	  that	  require	  the	  authorization	  infrastructure	  to	  
protect	  itself	  against	  attacks.	  Although,	  we	  have	  demonstrated	  SAAF’s	  capabilities	  and	  benefits,	  in	  its	  
current	  form	  there	  are	  some	  limitations.	  First,	  SAAF	  requires	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  trust	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  
it.	  In	  particular,	  SAAF	  must	  play	  the	  role	  of	  trusted	  ROOT,	  and	  act	  as	  the	  Source	  of	  Authority	  for	  both	  
service	  providers	  and	  identity	  providers	  (IdP).	  The	  reason	  being	  that	  not	  all	  IdPs	  would	  be	  
comfortable	  to	  allow	  a	  third	  party	  to	  affect	  their	  user	  attribute	  assignments.	  Second,	  the	  accuracy	  of	  
SAAF	  adaptations	  is	  also	  reliant	  on	  the	  specification	  by	  the	  service	  provider	  of	  applicable	  solutions	  to	  
patterns	  of	  malicious	  behavior,	  and	  this	  is	  not	  the	  most	  appropriate	  solution	  for	  socio-­‐technical	  
systems	  that	  are	  able	  to	  change	  in	  unpredictable	  terms.	  	  
Our	  future	  work	  involves	  the	  further	  development	  of	  SAAF,	  specifically,	  the	  definition	  a	  multi-­‐
attribute	  decision	  problem	  to	  improve	  the	  utility	  function	  used	  to	  select	  adaptation	  solutions.	  	  We	  
will	  draw	  upon	  work	  from	  trust	  access	  control	  [27],	  cost	  associated	  trust	  access	  control	  [4],	  and	  
utility	  [18]	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  formal	  framework	  for	  specifying	  clear	  controls	  that	  prevent	  wrongful	  
adaptation.	  Further	  research	  into	  SAAF	  will	  also	  focus	  on	  the	  marriage	  of	  SAAF	  with	  other	  
technologies	  that	  aid	  in	  identifying	  misuse,	  such	  as	  intrusion	  detection	  technologies	  that	  are	  capable	  
of	  analyzing	  misuse	  at	  the	  resource	  level.	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